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The Politics of the Rising Crime Statistics 
of England and Wales, 1914-1960 
Howard Taylor1 
T his article argues that between 1914 and 1960, the criminal statistics of England and Wales reflected supply-side politics rather than the amount of 
crime in the «real» world. After the police went on strike in 1918 their wages were 
increased. This led to central and local pressure to cut police numbers. Under the 
leadership of Sir Leonard Dunning, provincial police forces started to fight back by 
raising their crime statistics in order to move crime control up the political ladder. 
In 1930 the government accepted that crime figures would continue to rise and the 
Metropolitan Police, which was under Home Office control, quintupled its crime 
rate in three years to bring it into line with the provincial forces. The result was that 
in the post-Second World War period, crime control began to assume greater politi-
cal salience than alternative programmes of social welfare. 
Cet article soutient qu'entre 1914 et 1960, la statistique criminelle de l'Angle-
terre et du Pays de Galles refléta une «politique de l'offre» plutôt que l'importance 
de la criminalité dans la «réalité». Après la grève de la police de 1918, les salaires 
furent augmentés, ce qui suscita des pressions au niveau national et local en vue de 
réduire les effectifs. Sous la direction de Sir Leonard Dunning, les forces de police 
régionales ripostèrent en faisant augmenter leurs statistiques pour donner un poids 
politique plus important à la question de la criminalité. En 1930, le gouvernement 
admit que la statistique criminelle continuerait d'augmenter et la Metropolitan 
Police, qui était sous l'autorité du Home Office, quintupla son taux de criminalité 
en trois ans pour l'amener au niveau de celui des polices provinciales. Le résultat 
fut que, dans l'après-Seconde Guerre mondiale, la lutte contre la criminalité acquit 
une visibilité politique supérieure à celle des programmes sociaux alternatifs. 
Well before the First World War, there had developed at the Home Office, as 
Radzinowicz and Hood put it, a « very optimistic approach towards crime and its 
control»2. The international prestige and reputation of the Home Office derived 
1
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History Review and The politics of policing the motorist in preference to the drunk in inter-war 
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from its manifest control of crime as shown in the Judicial Statistics, which, by the 
outbreak of the First World War had been kept stationary for well over half a century 
and were even decreasing, relative to population growth3. The international opinion 
was that «England was freeing itself from its crime, a dream entertained in vain by 
so many European countries»4. 
The sporting image of British justice (and for the indigenous colonial population 
this largely meant criminal law) also gave legitimacy to British governance in the 
Empire. Particularly in India, which was in perpetual crisis, the government wanted 
to avoid supplying colonial independence movements with explosive evidence 
which suggested that the British people found their own institutions anything other 
than perfect5. Instead, it wished to inspire the Empire to emulate the image of the 
British people as the most orderly nation on earth, and submit gratefully to her 
benign rule as the moral policeman of the world. 
On the domestic front, since at least the 1880s, the salience of crime had been 
declining as a discrete social problem, encouraged by the statistics. By the early 
twentieth century, crime was widely seen as one of the lesser symptoms of a recently 
discovered general degeneration « in the quality of the nation, the fitness of the race 
and the efficiency of the Empire »6. The solution to crime, therefore, was believed to 
lie less in prisons than in the general improvement of the social and physical condi-
tion of the nation and, in particular, of the rapidly multiplying residuum who had 
been left behind by social progress. Consequently, social policy began « setting its 
course in a new direction away from deterrence and moralization » which had tradi-
tionally characterized criminal policy7. In its place, general programmes of social 
security, education, and eugenics were advocated to ameliorate real want, to prune 
and reinvigorate the stock, and to tutor the inefficient classes into more acceptable 
ways of living. Across the political spectrum, a progressive agenda developed where 
social progress, often advertised as a gratuitous by-product of capitalism or socia-
lism, came to be seen as a more important weapon than the police in the defence of 
society against crime and degeneration8. 
Contrasted with the wide-scale schemes of social reform coming on stream, cri-
minal justice appeared old-fashioned and ineffective. It was small-scale, rule-bound 
and obsessed with petty details - the circumstances surrounding a particular crime 
and the individuals involved. The modern professional flag-ship programmes of 
social reform, such as education, medicine and housing, appeared more efficient. 
They claimed to tackle and even to eradicate crime in the abstract and in the mass, 
as a by-product of increasing national efficiency9. Since state funds were finite, this 
inevitably led to competition for funding between social reform programmes and 
criminal justice. As early as the 1860s, Mr E.C. Tufnell, one of her Majesty's Ins-
pectors of Schools, promised that «if schools were universal... in 10 years' time we 
3
 Taylor (forthcoming). 
4
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should have approached to the annihilation of one-third of the criminal population... 
in 20 years we should... have gone far towards preventing two-thirds of the crimes 
committed in this country ». Education reformers eyed hungrily the £2,000,000 was-
ted on « repressive penal administration » 1 0. Short of promises possibly to reform a 
few prisoners, criminal justice, with its more modest aims, could not compete 
against such claims. 
At the level of political ideology, criminal justice was also in retreat. Reformers 
who aimed for the 'social good' were issuing a fundamental challenge to the tradi-
tional notion of the state as an external 'Leviathan' that existed only to protect indi-
vidual citizens from high levels of crime and disorder11. In 1851, it had not seemed 
at all eccentric for Herbert Spencer to argue, in Hobbesian fashion, 
Nay, indeed, have we not seen that government is essentially immoral? Is it not 
the offspring of evil, bearing about it all the marks of its parentage? Does it not 
exist because crime exists ? Is it not strong, or, as we say, despotic, when crime is 
great? Is there not more liberty, that is, less government as crime diminishes? 
And must not government cease when crime ceases, for lack of objects on which 
to perform its function?12 
Sixty years later, the situation had been transformed. After involvement in mea-
sures of social welfare, government seemed more inclusive and no longer immoral 
or dependent for its legitimacy upon crime. It could shed its criminal justice respon-
sibilities. A new situation had developed where expansive domestic and foreign 
policy were both justified (and partly funded) by the seeming development of law-
abidingness among the British people and the accompanying low and declining rate 
of crime, as recorded in the Judicial Statistics. The statistics allowed Britain, at the 
turn of the century to imprison only 1 in 1,764 of her subjects, mostly on short sen-
tences compared with America which imprisoned 1 in 759 for longer terms13. 
In these circumstances, it was not surprising that Victor Bailey found that the 
Home Office was presenting an upbeat, progressivist and declining analysis of the 
crime problem at the end of the First World War14. Falling crime statistics were now 
used by the state as one of the key indicators of the effectiveness of social reform, 
and of government itself, and there was no political incentive to change this. So, as 
the state increasingly ceased to regard itself as a Leviathan, the institutions of crimi-
nal justice were allowed slowly to wither away15. It was left to civil servants to deal 
with the long run-down of criminal justice administratively, cheaply and invisibly, 
and to prevent it re-emerging to the public as a problem out of control requiring 
expensive and impossible political solutions16. 
10
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When the First World War began, the number of 'Crimes Known to the Police', 
which was the 'headline' statistic used to measure the total amount of crime com-
mitted, fell very sharply until 1916, and then rose only moderately after that17. Many 
police officers had left their forces to enter the military, and the fall in the figures 
was used to allow police forces «to reduce the purely preventive duties» and 
concentrate more fully on war work18. Some routine patrol work was taken over by 
private citizens who enrolled as voluntary Special Constables or Women Police. 
They apparently found that they could do much of the job adequately themselves. 
During 1916, the press contained many stories of how crime was diminishing, 
courts were emptying, and prisons were closing19. It was suggested that the decrease 
in crime « will not end when the war ends ». The principle reason for this optimism 
being the restriction of alcohol sales which the « experts » said had previously been 
directly responsible for a «terrible... proportion of the crime of the country»20. 
Immediately after the War, therefore, crime was barely mentioned in the evidence 
given to the Desborough Committee on the police service (see below) or in the 
Commons' debate on the resulting Police Bill21. 
To an extent, complacency about crime encouraged a feeling that the police had 
become redundant in its daily duties. More astute members of the service, such as 
Sir Leonard Dunning, an Inspector of Constabulary, saw the writing on the wall, and 
before the end of the War was fearing for the future funding of professional preven-
tive policing: 
it remains to be seen whether the altered circumstances of the country will call for 
an increase of police forces, or whether the resumption of the police duties by the 
citizens themselves during the period of the war has taught them to rely upon their 
own powers for the protection of themselves and their property instead of leaning 
on the police22. 
Police funding and conditions had rapidly deteriorated during the War, and this 
had been aggravated because, for some years previous to the War, pay and promo-
tion prospects had been allowed to decline leading to the development of police 
trade unionism immediately before the war23. By 1918 police forces had became 
aged, «sickly » and discontented, and pay was eroded to a point where they were 
living close to the breadline24. Then in 1918, and again in 1919, the police went on 
strike25. 
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In February 1919, the Home Secretary announced the appointment of the 
Desborough Committee to inquire into what had now become the political problem 
of police service conditions. Desborough's most urgent task was to remove the fear, 
encouraged by police trade unionism, and expressed by the head of the CID and the 
political Special Branch, of the police ever «joining forces with the leaders of 
strike movements » 2 6. By «raising the economic, and thus the social, status of the 
average policeman far above anything he had previously achieved» to a semi-
professional status, it was hoped to buy the loyalty of the force27. Desborough awar-
ded large pay rises and banned unions28. Sir Leonard Dunning warned; «It is 
possible that the increasing cost of the police service will call for economy in 
numbers » 2 9. 
Under Desborough, the cost of policing was split equally between reluctant rate-
payers and a reluctant Home Office. The cost of maintaining the police establish-
ment, at the current level, trebled as a result of the Desborough award, from about 
£7,000,000 in 1914 to about £20,000,000 in 192030. In addition to finding the cost of 
the Desborough award, many local authorities had still to introduce the large 
increases in police establishments to cover the requirements of the 1910 Police 
Weekly (Rest Day) Act31. This Act, if fully implemented, threatened to raise costs by 
a further 20 percent without providing any additional increase in public protection. 
From both left and right, local authorities criticised the «grossly overpaid» post-
Desborough police and had no great wish to maintain either their numbers or bud-
gets32. Central Government was in its usual ungenerous mood and remained 
« unwilling to pay more than half the cost of the police » 3 3. In the opinion of an 
Assistant Secretary at the Home Office, « The Home Office finds it very difficult to 
get money for anything, and I think we have a sort of feeling that it is going to be 
very much harder... The police are always rather a luxury, and some localities can 
afford the luxury more than others » 3 4. 
Throughout most of the inter-war and immediate post-war period, this attitude 
persisted. SJ. Stevenson has argued that there was no evidence that « an increase in 
police numbers was really a matter of overriding Home Office concern ». This was 
true. In 1929, A.L. Dixon, on behalf of the Police Department put it succinctly, « The 
number of Police required for the maintenance of order, or the suppression of disor-
der, is far fewer to-day » 3 5. It appeared that the police were going to need either to 
find some urgent new work, such as crime or traffic control, to justify their new 
2 6
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2 7
 Martin, Wilson (1969, p. 36). 
2 8
 Judge (1968, p. 2). 
29
 Inspectors of constabulary, P.P. (1920 (91), XXII.463, p. 3). 
3 0
 Critchley(1978,p. 193). 
3 1
 Martin, Wilson (1969, p. 37) ; Critchley (1978, pp. 171 ff). 
3 2
 Judge (1994, p. 41). 
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 Martin, Wilson (1969, p. 55). 
3 4
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 Stevenson (1995, p. 63); Evidence of A.L. Dixon, Royal commission on police powers, (1929, 
p. 173). 
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expensive semi-professional status or, as the Inspectors of Constabulary feared, 
expect calls for their numbers to be reduced36. 
These calls were made repeatedly37, and for almost the entire inter-war period, 
police numbers and expenditure was subject to constraints and review, particularly 
during the economic crises of 1922 and 1931. By 1932, Sir Llewelyn Atcherley, an 
Inspector of Constabulary, was complaining that « we have been for so many years 
economising and economising that we have come almost to bedrock. We are even 
discussing wearing one pair of trousers instead of two » 3 8. In these circumstances, 
the police did extremely well to keep their manpower virtually stationary throughout 
the period, the actual strength of the police in England and Wales in 1921 was 
59,520, in 1935 it was 59,230, and by the run-up to the Second World War 1939 it 
had reached 63,980, but much of this increase was in anticipation of civil defence 
work39. 
Figure 1 
Suddenly, the situation transformed as crime began to move up the political 
agenda. The reason was that, in 1920, crime indices, which had remained almost sta-
36
 Inspectors of constabulary, P.P. (1920 (91), XXII.463, p. 3). 
3 7
 See, example the comment made by Sir Hugh Bell, a coal owner and magistrate, to the Monthly lun-
cheon of the individualiste Bookshop; « he was willing to pay a reasonable amount and not the extra-
vagant sums he had to pay now, when he did not get that regulation and order that he wanted and 
when he got a good deal he did not want.» The sort of regulation and order he wanted was that main-
tained in Sweden where police had threatened to fire on strikers. This meeting was attended by 
Edward Shortt who, as Home Secretary, had set up the Desborough Committee, Times (27 October 
1927, p. 11). 
3 8
 Evidence of Sir Llewelyn Atcherley, Select committee on the amalgamation of police forces, (1931-
2, p. 157). 
3 9
 Martin, Wilson (1969, p. 47). 
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tic for decades started coming to life. Leading the figures upwards was the table of 
'Indictable Offences Known to the Police'. In just two years this had reached an all-
time high of 107,000 crimes). From then on, with remarkable consistency until the 
late 1970s, with the exception of a brief interlude in the 1950s, this figure almost 
doubled every decade. 
II. 
In his report for 1920-1, Sir Leonard Dunning, the senior Inspector of Constabu-
lary had asked; « Can anything be done by central criticism and instruction to give 
this figure of Crimes Known to the Police the value which it ought to possess ? It 
does not seem likely that many crimes are wrongly included, but the exclusion of 
crimes which ought to appear is beyond doubt » 4 0. 
As the senior Inspector of Constabulary41 when the war ended, Sir Leonard Dun-
ning was well placed and highly motivated to raise the standards of policing and 
protect its resources. Although he has received little attention in the historiography, 
he was one of the leading police officers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century who were effecting « a shift in the balance of police work away from the pre-
servation of public order towards the prevention and detection of individual 
crimes » 4 2. Although prevention had always been a primary duty of the police, Dun-
ning took the concept further than other leading police figures by seeking to recreate 
parts of the duties of the uniformed police almost as a branch of social service. 
Before the end of the First World War, Dunning had already felt that the official sta-
tistics greatly understated the extent of crime and, in particular, that the figures did 
not show how much crime was rising. After he was appointed Inspector of Consta-
bulary in 1912 he wrote; « if the returns... did really show all the cases which ought 
to be included, there would be on paper an increase of crime, which by its obvious 
exaggeration would draw attention away from the real increase, consistent and pro-
gressive for some years past » 4 3. 
Before the First World War, Dunning had been the Head Constable of Liverpool. 
His predecessor, Sir William Nott-Bower, later admitted, « It is impossible to com-
pare Liverpool (as has been attempted) with other towns by quoting statistics » 4 4. 
Liverpool's figures were much higher than anywhere else and they were used to jus-
tify the highest police man-power levels per acre, and per head of population outside 
London45. In the 1890's, the Home Office began to impose uniformity, and Sir 
William brought Liverpool in line with other cities. By the time he left, he had 
brought Liverpool's crime 'co-efficient' sharply down to exactly the rate of 611 
crimes per 100,000, that the Home Office expected from a 'normal' for a seaport46. 
40
 Inspectors of constabulary, P.P. (1922 (5), X.303, p. 11). 
4 1
 The body officially responsible for inspecting and maintaining the efficiency of all police forces, 
apart from the Metropolitan Police. 
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 Martin, Wilson (1969, p. 11). For the reluctance of police to detect and prosecute indictable crime in 
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43
 Inspectors of constabulary, P.P. (1914 (193), LXVII.663, p. 57). 
4 4
 Nott-Bower (1926, p. 142). 
45
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tricts. Seaports, such as Liverpool, normally had the highest crime rates averaging 611.10 indictable 
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He also made an « unparalleled » 75 percent cut in Liverpool's enormous figures for 
drink prosecutions and brought about a very large decline in prosecutions for 
offences against the person47. In 1902, Nott-Bower left to take up the chief consta-
bleship of the City of London and Dunning, his deputy, was appointed the new Head 
Constable. 
Reviewing Dunning's first years as Head Constable, Francis Caldwell, the Head 
of CID, revealed, « the offence work has increased very much in the last five years 
and is still on the increase » 4 8. On 1 June 1903, Dunning introduced a new system of 
recording crime and, by the end of 1905, the city's crime rate had doubled compared 
with 190249. Dunning's stated aim was to make his figures « further reaching and 
more reliable » 5 0 . As a result, Liverpool had, by a great margin, the highest crime 
rate in England and Wales. With 1,222 crimes per 100,000, she had three times 
Birmingham's rate of 416, over four times London's rate of 300, and nearly five 
times Leeds' rate of 263. The average for England and Wales was only 2775 1. What 
was not commented upon was that Dunning had exactly doubled the Liverpool 
crime rate. Immediately upon his appointment, Dunning began to push the crime 
rate to an all-time high of 1221.68 per 100,0000, an increase of 99.81 percent in 
three years. This was clearly a planned, bookkeeping increase, since there was no 
increase in persons apprehended for indictable offences52. Dunning's attitude was, 
as he later admitted in 1919, « Now, of crimes known to the police, the figure is one 
on which to place very little reliance, because it is what I call a discretionary statis-
tic; the man who has to prepare that figure can put down pretty much what he 
likes » 5 3. 
Dunning received a mild rebuke and check in the Judicial Statistics of 1905; 
« much stress ought not to be laid upon this increase ». It went on to warn that Dun-
ning's action had cast doubt upon the integrity of the statistics as a whole. His 
figures were « exceedingly high... They raise doubts whether all the figures here sta-
ted have been collected in the same manner » 5 4. Nonetheless, Liverpool's figures 
continued to rise, from 4,234 in 1902 to 14,041 in 1910 - an increase of over 16 per 
cent per annum. In these eight years, Dunning had raised Liverpool's share of 'Indic-
table Crimes Known to the Police' from 5 per cent to 13 percent of the total for 
England and Wales, although the City still only employed about 3 per cent of the 
total police force. 
The reason Dunning had raised the figures was because he had a clear vision of 
how he would like professional policing to develop that involved increased numbers 
and duties. He wanted to follow up crimes even when they were unlikely to lead to 
prosecutions: 
crimes per 100,000, Judicial statistics, P.P. (1900 [Cd. 123], CIII.1, p. 31). By 1902, when Nott-Bower 
left, Liverpool's rate was 'normal' at 611.41. 
47
 Judicial statistics, P.P. (1901 [Cd. 705], LXXXIX.257, p. 73). 
48
 Inspectors of constabulary, P.P. (1907 (128), XXXI.1, p. 97). 
4 9
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 Ibid. (p. 66). 
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 Evidence of Sir Leonard Dunning, Committee on the police service, (1920, p. 82). 
54
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if the older attitude provided excuses for slackness, the newer attitude must sti-
mulate action. In old times a crime by a child, if not thought worth a prosecution 
was in too many places not followed up... but prevention of crime is the first duty 
of the police, and anything which tends, however remotely, to the prevention of 
crime is their work; after all, the boy saved from crime and the girl saved from 
infamy are the gains, moral and material, of the community, whether the saving 
be done by the parson or by the police55. 
III. 
In the immediate post-Desborough period, Dunning exercised great influence 
over policing policy. In 1912 he was appointed the junior Inspector of Constabulary, 
in 1918, he became the senior Inspector. The second Inspector during the immediate 
post-Desborough years, Sir Llewelyn Atcherley, was not appointed until 1919, long 
after Dunning. At the time he gave evidence to the Desborough Committee, Atcher-
ley had only been at the Home Office for « a few weeks » 5 6. So, although he was an 
innovator and had long enjoyed great status and prestige in the police service, 
Atcherley's appointment came too late to exert a decisive influence in the formative 
period, immediately during and after Desborough, when police establishments were 
under particular scrutiny and strategies were urgently needed to safeguard police 
numbers from the anticipated calls for economy. Moreover, Atcherley's expertise 
and interest lay in the development, as recommended by Desborough, of co-opera-
tive arrangements between police forces and in the establishment of crime clearing-
houses of which he was a pioneer57. 
The Home Office had no other expert to rival Dunning. Until Desborough focu-
sed the Home Office's attention on routine policing duties, the Department had had, 
as Edward Troup, the Permanent Under-Secretary revealed in 1925, « little to do 
with the ordinary executive duties of County and Borough Police - the suppression 
of crime, the arrest and prosecution of offenders » 5 8. In the view of Sir Leonard Dun-
ning; His Majesty's Government, « has information about the experience of the 
Metropolitan Police alone, it knows little of what the other 186 police forces in 
England and Wales are doing, the developments in police methods initiated by them 
and the work which they do which the Metropolitan Police does not do » 5 9. 
So far as the statistics were concerned, this had not mattered to the Home Office 
in the past, since the Inspectors generally maintained the status quo, equating low 
rates of crime with efficiency60. Dunning had a very different philosophy. As the 
Reports of the Inspectors of Constabulary show, he identified low crime rates as a 
sign of police inaction and urged forces to put up their figures61. Chief constables 
5 5
 Evidence of Sir Leonard Dunning, Departmental committee on the duties of women police, (1921, p. 11). 
5 6
 Evidence of Sir Llewelyn Atcherley, Committee on the police service (1920, p. 337). 
57
 Inspectors of constabulary, P.P. (1914 (193), LXVII.663, pp. 3-4); Critchley (1978, pp. 193 ff.); 
Dixon (1936). 
5 8
 Troup (1925, p. 103). 
5 9
 Evidence of Sir Leonard Dunning, Committee on the police service (1920, p. 86). 
6 0
 See, for example, Inspectors of constabulary, P.P. (1861 (67), LII.641, p. 9). 
6 1
 Evidence of Sir Leonard Dunning, Departmental committee on the duties of women police (1921, 
p. 12); Inspectors of constabulary, P.P. (1922 (5), X.303, p. 12). 
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could respond because Desborough had deliberately increased their political auto-
nomy from their police authorities62 who wanted to keep crime levels low. 
The main Home Office official who was in a position to challenge Dunning was 
Arthur Dixon, the Secretary to the Desborough Committee who, during the War, had 
taken charge of an embryonic Home Office Police Department, but its main concern 
had not been with crime, but with the policing of the Defence of the Realm Act63. 
The Police Department of the Home Office was not formed until 1922, as a result of 
a Desborough recommendation, so in the crucial years of 1919 and 1920, Dixon still 
lacked the status, organization, knowledge, and experience to exert a counter-
influence over such a senior voice in policing circles as Dunning. At that time, 
Dixon was still on a learning curve, over-burdened with Desborough work and, 
according to the President of the Chief Constable's Association, he « did not then 
know much about the inner workings of the Service.. I heard it said: 'Mr Dixon at 
the Home Office is eating up everything appertaining to the Police' » 6 4. 
So, initially, until Dixon and Atcherley could establish themselves, Dunning was 
in a very powerful position to preach a vision of large-scale, large-establishment 
preventive policing as the model for a new, post-Desborough professional police 
force65. His evidence to the Desborough Committee, and the fact that he was twice 
recalled, confirm he had become the leading voice of police professionalism in the 
country and, largely owing to the vacuum of disinterest at the Home Office, he was 
the only witness to the Committee who displayed a clear conception of the direction 
a professional force might take at this critical juncture in police history66. When, 
shortly after Desborough, plans to cut police establishments were revealed, Dun-
ning's unsurprising reply was that he was «mainly concerned in attaining a result 
opposite to the reduction that is now being sought » 6 7. 
IV. 
In 1921, the publication of the preliminary report of the Census led police autho-
rities to discuss in earnest whether so many police were necessary per head of popu-
lation68. The following year, the first large attack on the police establishment came 
with the Geddes Axe on Public Expenditure which required a 5 percent saving in 
police numbers. This amounted to a cut of 1,000 uniformed beat officers from the 
Metropolitan Police alone69. Neither Geddes nor many police authorities believed 
that the existing numbers of police were still justified. In order « that the numbers of 
Police will be adequately reduced » the report suggested, 
6 2
 Weinberger (1991, p. 213). 
63
 Inspectors of constabulary,P.P. (1919 (38), XXVII.671, p. 4). 
6 4
 Vote of thanks to Arthur Dixon by Chief Constable R. Ogle. Dixon (1936, pp. 59-60). 
6 5
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67
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68
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a full investigation should now be made as to the strength of all Police Forces, 
beginning with those whose present establishment appears to be on a more gene-
rous scale than the average, and that the Home Office should at once endeavour 
to arrive at a basis of the numbers required for the adequate policing of each area. 
We think that such a basis, calculated upon acreage, population and ratable value, 
should be introduced with the least possible delay70. 
Forces were well aware that they had no influence over the variables of acreage, 
population, or rateable value. Police forces did however, have control over that « dis-
cretionary statistic » of the amount of indictable crime recorded71 and, as S.J. Ste-
venson has observed, they used it to persuade police authorities to endorse calls 
from the forces for increases: 
Long-term increases in reported crime made all Chief Constables, Borough 
Watch Committees, and Standing Joint Committees in the counties exceedingly 
anxious to retain or increase numbers of local police in any urban centre, and 
always the trend was now to justify new requests not in terms of police per head 
of population but rather in terms of police available relative to steady increases in 
reported crime72. 
Writing in 1932, James Clayton, the Chief Constable of Doncaster, a representa-
tive of the Chief Constables' Association, and who had served at every rank in the 
service, was quite clear that « the increase in the number of crimes is more apparent 
than real » and that the decision to record crimes of a « nominal » value, such as « the 
stealing of a bottle of milk from a doorstep », originated in the « book-keeping » deci-
sions of a number of chief constables73. The obvious conclusion is that these senior 
police officers had played the crime card to undermine Geddes and, by extension, 
government policy with the hope of, at least, maintaining, if not improving their esta-
blishments. Consequently, Geddes was informed, by Dunning, through the medium 
of the Reports of the Inspectors of Constabulary, that the level of crime had to be 
taken into account when deciding police strengths; « if anybody proposes to occupy 
bis time in searching for this formula, which has still to be found, there is another 
figure which he should most certainly include in his calculations... the 'crime-coeffi-
cient' of the police district » 7 4. In a classic version of an argument that had been heard 
before and was to be rehearsed many times over the next seven decades, Dunning 
continued; « One may at once say that the reliability of these figures has improved 
very much of late years and that they now come nearer to a correct representation of 
facts than they did in years gone by... [this figure is] one reason why vacancies should 
be filled and, in some cases why establishments should be increased » 7 5. 
70
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When discussing drink convictions in his 1920-1 Report, Dunning likened the 
selection process to a machine for grading road metal, where the grades of stone 
used could be changed. To increase its convictions, a police force merely needed to 
increase the gauge of the holes in the machine. He was arguing that crime statistics 
could be made to appear to rise when the statistical base changed from year to year; 
« In this simile of the machine, one must remember that it is not one machine of 
known and stable gauge which might be expected to give stable results, but that the 
180 odd police forces represent so many machines of which no two were originally 
of uniform gauge or are kept to gauge from year to year » 7 6. So, to increase the crime 
figures, Dunning merely had to persuade a number of forces to keep increasing the 
gauges they used to record indictable crime. 
Since property offences were the main concern of the police, the gauge most 
forces used was the monetary value of the goods stolen. In all forces there was a vast 
reservoir of unrecorded crime since large numbers of smaller property offences 
went uninvestigated and were traditionally « cuffed » 7 7 from the records or else redu-
ced to non-indictable charges. Dunning encouraged chief constables to record more 
of this minor crime. He provided chief constables with arguments to persuade their 
police authorities that some of this should really be treated as serious crime requi-
ring augmentations to their establishments: 
the test of mere money value, which is generally accepted, is fallacious. To justify 
one's saying that a crime is serious or not, one must know how it affects not only 
the person who suffers by it, but also the person who commits it. The theft of five 
shillings may not seem serious, but would be so if the five shillings stood between 
the loser and actual want, and it must be remembered that the poor, to whom five 
shillings may mean much, suffer more from crime than the rich... Again, if the 
theft were the first success which started a child on a life of crime, it would be 
serious... Again, such a theft if the work of an old hand with not the smallest inten-
tion of reform, would not be serious so far as he was concerned, it would only add 
another spot to the leopard's skin. The word «serious» will inevitably be used in 
any discussion on the sufficiency of a police force for dealing with crime78. 
Traditionally, those who reported crimes to the police were often met with open 
disbelief and, unless they were obviously respectable, could face a mini third degree 
to establish their status, credibility and whether they had sufficient finances to pro-
secute, before the police would accept the crime and start an investigation. In the 
1930s, standard police works were still advising officers that « The class of person 
involved should be recorded by the investigating officer » and that he should obtain 
such information as: What is his « financial status »? « Is the complainant genuine »? 
Does the complainant have delusions ? 7 9. However, by the early 1930s, the author of 
these questions, Major-General Llewelyn Atcherley, Dunning's fellow Inspector of 
Constabulary, had noted, « the disposition now is to more often register a doubtful 
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instance as crime - in the absence of positive proof one way or another - rather than 
to exclude it for the same reasons » 8 0. 
Before the War, to keep crime figures down, most reports of theft were entered 
into a Suspected Stolen Book, rather than into the Crime Book, « unless subsequent 
evidence or the conviction of the person by a Court removed any further possibility 
of doubt » 8 1. This kept the figures down, the clear-up rate high, and cut down on 
police work, since this placed the onus on the injured party to prove that a crime had 
been committed, rather than on the police to investigate whether or not this was the 
case. 
The abolition of the Suspected Stolen Book was an easy way to raise crime 
figures at a stroke. From the 1920s, many of the sudden permanent leaps in crime 
that appeared in the local statistics, can most probably be explained by Suspected 
Stolen Books being abolished, either within a division, or within an entire force. 
Otherwise, more gentle and constant increases could be obtained by changing 
practices in the classification of offences. Offences could be classified in any 
number of ways depending on the orders given to charge officers and the way the 
elements of the offence were interpreted. So, a charge officer could reduce an 
offence to make it non-indictable, or increase it to an indictable crime. To raise a 
force's figures, it was only necessary to set the charge officer a target to increase 
indictable crimes by a certain percentage. Since vastly more offences were 
classified as non-indictable or suspected crime than were recorded as indictable, 
police forces had an enormous reservoir of what had been traditionally dismissed as 
minor offences that could at any time be promoted to make a serious indictable 
crime. 
Consequently, the great rise in house and shop breakings, that were a notable and 
alarming feature of the inter-war period, probably largely resulted from changes in 
classification of small offences. There were earlier precedents. In London, in 1878, 
following the formation of the CID the previous year, burglaries and housebreakings 
suddenly rose 330 percent due to a change of classification from « larcenies or kin-
dred offences ». The Judicial statistics noted in 1899: 
Crimes which at one time and in one district are classified as burglary will at ano-
ther time and elsewhere be classified as larceny, and conversely. Thus, opening 
premises by means of skeleton keys or lifting a window already half open or 
pushing back a catch of a window might be variously described in different 
returns. An apparent increase of burglary and housebreaking has sometimes been 
really ascribable to a sudden application of strict legal definitions82. 
This was what Dunning meant in his frequent calls for a « more uniform admi-
nistration of the law » 8 3. Uniformity in applying legal definitions would mean that 
80
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There still remained one obstacle in the way of chief constables raising their 
crime figures. Most police authorities would not fund an increase in prosecutions 
and this would leave chief constables looking inefficient. As figure 2 shows, the 
total number of indictable prosecutions did not begin to rise until a decade after the 
police figures began to rise. Dunning had an answer. A decision in the new Court of 
Criminal Appeal in R. v. Syres (1908), allowed other offences admitted by a priso-
ner to be taken into consideration by the courts84. As a result, the Home Office added 
a new column to the Judicial statistics in 1910 and expanded it, in 1912, to include 
other cases of 'Crimes of which the perpetrators were detected but for which no pro-
ceedings are shown'85. In his report for 1920-1, Sir Leonard argued how a chief 
constable could use this column to break the traditional link between prosecutions 
and crimes known to the police: 
a certain Chief Constable, who, when his Crime Book was under inspection, 
expatiated on the difficulties caused to the police by persons refusing to prose-
cute, instancing a case in which an employer had complained to the police of 
thefts of raw material and then refused to prosecute an employee red-handed. 
Asked to show the case in his Crime Book he explained its absence: 'Why should 
I show a crime committed without any chance of showing a prisoner against it?' 
Though it is seldom so frankly admitted, it is understood to be the rule in some 
places to exclude from the return any case in which the injured person refuses to 
apply for process. Of late years a column has been added to the returns for sho-
wing the cases in which, though the perpetrators have been detected, there has 
been no prosecution, but the Chief Constable in question does not seem to have 
grasped this as an opportunity for preserving, even of improving, his cherished 
percentage86. 
Until the end of the First World War this figure remained at around 6,000 to 
7,000 crimes a year or somewhat below 7 percent of the total number of crimes 
known. By 1922, the figure of crimes detected but not prosecuted, had risen to 13 
percent of the total. By the late 1920s, as the crime figures rose, it was approaching 
25 percent of crimes of known to the police87 and had absorbed much of the increa-
sed crime. 
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small thefts would have to be classed everywhere as serious housebreakings or 
shopbreakings, placing pressure on authorities to increase police numbers. 
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Figure 2 
VI I . 
The sudden inflation of the police figures seems to have taken the Home Office 
by surprise. Evidence of this is that the Metropolitan Police, the only force which 
remained directly under Home Office control and also not subject to the influence of 
the Inspectors of Constabulary, continued to follow pre-war practices by recording 
a more or less constant level of between 15,000 and 17,000 indictable crimes in the 
decade 1919-2988. Throughout the rest of England and Wales crime rose about 65 
percent in this period89. 
Until at least the mid-1920s, the Home Office stone-walled over the police 
figures. As an institution, it had at stake its prestige and reputation which depended 
upon its manifest control of crime. Moreover, the implication of rising crime was 
increased expenditure. It advised the public and politicians, to discount the increa-
sed police reporting of indictable offences as mere statistics and reassured them that 
crime « shows a definite tendency to further diminution » 9 0. Most police authorities 
had no more reason to want rising crime than the Home Office. They wanted their 
district's reputation to be kept clean from crime. Politically, there were calls for eco-
nomy during the inter-war depression and all authorities had many other pressing 
spending priorities to meet. 
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The Home Office at first insisted that the police figures were unreliable, and that 
the almost constant number of prosecutions undertaken each year should be accep-
ted as the measure of crime, as it had been in the nineteenth century91. These were 
supported by the Prison Statistics which similarly supported the traditional Home 
Office policy of falling crime. So, the 1922 Judicial statistics argued: 
The figures of persons for trial for indictable offences are usually regarded as the 
most trustworthy index of the state of crime. Generally, the conclusions drawn 
from these figures are confirmed by those suggested by the figures relating to 
crimes known to the police. Latterly, however, the last mentioned figures have 
increased, while the number of persons for trial has become stationary or has even 
diminished9 2. 
The police, therefore, had to expect powerful opposition before their figures 
were officially accepted as the best index of the real state of crime. Dunning fought 
strongly, in his Desborough evidence he had expressed the view that the small num-
ber of trials was no indication of the amount of crime. Instead prosecutions needed 
to rise: 
where the police authority avoids every possible expenditure of money, the police 
often have to do the same as the injured person - nothing. Central control might 
help here - especially in the direction of assigning the cost. But the control would 
have to be very different from that now exercised by the Director of Public Pro-
secutions. If all prosecutions which seem to be advisable in the public interest 
were undertaken by the Director of Public Prosecutions, or if all police authorities 
acted alike in authorising the police to undertake them, a great deal more protec-
tion would be given to property93. 
He also argued that the other figures had not risen for the simple reason that the 
police were being kept short of men and so could not catch criminals: 
It may be safely assumed that a reduction of the police will lead to a reduction 
possibly of the Assize Calendar figures, certainly of those accepted by the Prison 
Commissioners, because without doubt the fewer the police the fewer will be the 
people brought to trial94. 
He skilfully disputed the Home Office's argument that education had reduced 
crime. Instead, he argued, « Though crime against the person is decreasing, crime 
against property, the crime of civilization, is increasing » 9 5. He also doubted that 
crime had been diminished by drink legislation since the War. He warned the Home 
Office could draw no conclusions from statistics of falling drink prosecutions; « the 
convictions for drunkenness bear no known or stable relation to the amount of drun-
kenness nor provide any measure of the result of legislative or administrative 
changes » 9 6. Over the next few years, Dunning tried to position the police among the 
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expanding medical and social services which claimed to be preventing and curing 
crime, rather than among the courts and penal institutions who dealt only with fai-
lures. In this vein, he attacked Home Office reliance on the figures of the courts 
rather than taking into account wider effects of police work; « it is like measuring 
the fluctuations of some disease by the number of deaths only instead of by the total 
number of patients » 9 7. 
Dunning insisted that crime really was rising « by leaps and bounds » to record 
levels98. The Home Office continued to deny this, maintaining «The proportions 
that the indictable offences known to the police have borne to every 100,000 of the 
estimated population are far safer guides » and concluding « the crime rate has fallen 
greatly since 1857 » 9 9. Slowly, the ground shifted in favour of the police as their 
figures rose higher and higher and Home Office explanations began to sound more 
and more complacent and far-fetched. In 1923, the number of court proceedings 
were still accepted by the Home Office as the leading index, although it was now 
admitted that the police figures « are, however, more trustworthy now than for-
merly » 1 0 0 . For the next few years the Judicial statistics continued to explain away 
the rise in the police figures as 'statistical', diplomatically discounting the police 
figures of rising crime by suggesting that some of the growth was caused by the 
increased « numbers and efficiency of the police » leading to more crime being dis-
covered101. 
The 1925 commentary anticipated history repeating itself when it predicted that six 
years after the Boer War « the tide turned » for crime and that this was now the sixth year 
after the end of the Great War. Perhaps the Home Office was indicating to the police that 
six years of rising crime was quite enough. It called for an effort to be made to return to 
the ante-bellum level of crime, which was where the Home Office wished to be; « first, 
to securing a speedy return to the best standard recorded, and then to improving even 
upon that standard » 1 0 2. When the figures did not fall after six years, the Judicial 
statistics still denied that there was any «permanent tendency of serious crime » to 
rise103. 
In their Report for 1927-28, the Inspectors of Constabulary were optimistic, and 
predicted that the recent small increase in the size of the police establishment was 
« the trickle before a flood » 1 0 4. The following year they promised « the demands for 
more men are likely to be heavy in the next few years » 1 0 5. They had sound reason 
for their optimism. The Judicial statistics, 1928, showed that the Home Office had 
finally given way after a decade of unrelenting police pressure. The Home Office 
grudgingly conceded at last that the police figures were « the best available guide to 
the volume of serious crime » 1 0 6. In « the very long term » the Home Office still 
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maintained crime was not increasing in relation to population and that it was still the 
pre-war pattern of crime statistics which was «normal». The 1928 edition, which 
was published in 1930 included an uniquely lengthy survey of patterns of crime 
since 1857 which it used to make a final defence of progressivism, and social reform 
policies as the most effective way to deal with crime. It restated its policy that the 
spread of education must have reduced crime rather than increased it, and that gene-
ral improvements in family standards and less drunkenness, «ought» to lead to « a 
diminution in juvenile crime and petty offences... in years to come » 1 0 7. 
1930 was a watershed in criminal policy when it was officially accepted that 
crime figures would continue to rise. In the four years 1929-33 the amount of indic-
table crime recorded by the Metropolitan Police, who were directly under Home 
Office control, quintupled from 17,664 to 83,668 so that the force now admitted to 
approximately one third of crime in England and Wales being committed within its 
boundaries. Significantly, the strength of the Met was also about one third of the 
total national police force108. It appears that the Metropolitan Police, and other 
forces, used the general increase in the statistics to reallocate their 'crime coeffi-
cients' amongst themselves. The aim may have been to produce a reasonable cor-
respondence between the amount of crime reported, and the size of the police force, 
so that a national standard could viably be produced to include in any future Geddes-
style formula for assessing police numbers. This would explain why crime rose so 
little in Liverpool in the inter-war period when previously it had risen so rapidly. 
Dunning, had already so massively raised the City's 'co-efficient of crime' above 
the amount of crime, per officer, of other forces, that the City had to wait for the 
other forces to catch up. 
VI I I . 
Although, so far; no major study has been made of local police statistics in this 
period, there is evidence that the statistics were being closely coordinated by the 
police establishment at the local and national level and so were doing more than 
merely following the apparently random «fluctuations with an upward tendency » 
that characterized the statistics of individual forces109. McClintock and Avison exa-
mined trends in crime-rates for a number of different geographical groupings of 
forces, partly to forecast crime levels following a projected reorganization of police 
boundaries. They found taking « The incidence of crime and the increase in crime in 
each of the proposed new police areas.... it is found that for the years, 1955-65, there 
have been considerable variations in crime rates from one area to another » 1 1 0. Howe-
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ver, when they examined the existing police conference regions they found a distinct 
pattern; « the national upward trend in crime from 1955 onwards has been reflected 
in the trends in each police conference region. Variations between regions are not 
great » 1 1 1 . In other words, although the statistics of the individual police forces that 
comprised each of the nine police conference districts appeared to be showing no 
clear trend, when they were combined together at police conference level (but not 
when combined together in other groupings such as the proposed new police autho-
rity areas) they showed a close correspondence to the national trend. This suggests 
that the conference area was the basic statistical unit. Moreover, it appears at that 
level that senior police officers had a relatively free hand since at that level, in A.L. 
Dixon's opinion, their proceedings were nothing to do with the Home Office112. 
Other evidence suggests the statistics were coordinated on a national scale with 
such precision that they could be raised or lowered by the number of serving offi-
cers. This appears to be the case when, at the end of the 1940s, the crime figures sud-
denly stopped rising and began to fluctuate up and down. In 1949, Ronald Howe, the 
head of the Metropolitan Police C.I.D. hinted that a turning point had been reached. 
That year the figures fell enormously, providing a convenient breathing-space for 
detectives. He wrote, «Now, and especially where I work in the largest City of the 
world with all the problems that follow a great war, our detectives, as they move 
from case to case, sigh for the time for detailed investigation... now I feel that, after 
a long period of overwork since the war, we are gradually getting back to proper 
investigation, which will lead to proper results » 1 1 3. The explanation commonly 
advanced was that the late 1940s and early 1950s was « a period of social adjustment 
following the aftermath of the war and the consolidation of the welfare state... At the 
time these oscillations were taken too indicate that the upward curve in crime had 
reached its peak and would shortly fall and become stabilized at a pre-war level » 1 1 4. 
However, others were more suspicious. In 1977, Sir Leon Radzinowicz, the leading 
British criminologist, speculated without providing his readers with any further evi-
dence; « Could the short-lived respite enjoyed in the nineteen-fifties be attributed to 
a sudden police go-slow ?» 1 1 5. 
It appears Radzinowicz's speculation was well-informed. The late 1940s and 
early 1950s were a time of intense competition between the political parties. At the 
end of the war, the police claimed that the combined effect of the Depression and of 
the War had led to their pay and status being eroded. Officers called for another Des-
borough-type pay award or a new police charter. In 1945 the crime figures rose 
sharply and began to push crime, which had not «immediately» pressed itself 
« upon the government's attention », up the political agenda116. In September 1946 
the police received a pay rise on condition that pay would remain frozen for three 
years during which there would be « a comprehensive review of police conditions of 
service » 1 1 7. Grievances built up. By 1948, «there was mounting discontent in the 
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police service, criticism in Parliament, and a serious problem of inadequate recruit-
ment » 1 1 8 . Detective departments, in particular, were over-loaded and needed either 
more men, or a reduction in crime. The Police Federation pressed for an independent 
pay review. 
The Government responded by passing a series of acts bringing some institutio-
nal change to the administration of criminal justice. Crime was clearly back on the 
agenda and the 1948 Criminal Justice Act provided a few extra long-term prison 
slots and the opportunity for courts to award short, sharp shocks for juveniles. None-
theless, the 1948 statistics shot up to reach a record 522,684 crimes. Never before 
had the number of recorded crimes passed the symbolic figure of 500,000. In May, 
the Government agreed to set up the Oaksey Committee on Police pay and recruit-
ment1 1 9. The following year recorded crimes fell back by an astonishing 62,815 to 
459,869. Since 1916, the crime rate had only previously fallen twice, each time by 
about 6,000, in 1927 and 1946. The 1949 fall was, therefore, 1,000per cent greater 
than any other ever recorded. In this light, it was perhaps significant that the total 
actual strength of the police in England and Wales at the end of 1949 was 61,166 or 
97.37 per cent of the 62,815 total fall in crime120. Since they were forbidden to take 
industrial action, it appears the police gave the Government a most impressive dis-
play of power and solidarity by reducing the crime figures by almost one crime for 
every serving officer. 
Nonetheless, the Oaksey Committee, which reported in 1949 during a pay 
freeze121, recommended only a 15 per cent rise whereas the police had asked for bet-
ween 33 per cent and 54 per cent. The police remained dissatisfied and recruitment 
remained a major problem. In 1951 the police again came back for a pay rise, and 
the crime figure for 1951 went back up massively by about 14 per cent to 524,506, 
a rise of 63,071. The number of serving police officers at the end of 1951 had by 
now risen to 63,116, or only 35 officers more than the rise in crime. Again the police 
were granted a pay review. In August 1951 constables were given another 20 per 
cent on top of the Oaksey award122. The crime figure for 1952 fell back slightly to 
513,559. Early in 1952, Chief Constables and all grades above superintendent were 
in their turn awarded a back-dated flat rate increment of £150 1 2 3. The crime figure 
for 1953 fell back about 7 per cent to 472,989. In 1954 a further 9 per cent was awar-
ded to the police. The crime figure again fell back over 8 per cent to 434,327 and 
rose less than 4,000 the following year. 
« 1954 saw the end of the temporary recession in crime » 1 2 4. In the 1955 general 
election, the Conservatives gained the clear electoral ascendency over Labour. Bet-
ween then and 1960 the police submitted three further claims for pay rises, but there 
was no longer the same political pressure to meet police demands and each time no 
agreement was reached and the claims had to go to arbitration125. Over the next few 
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years the crime statistics rose at a massive rate. In 1956 they went up nearly 10 per 
cent to 480,000. In 1957 they rose nearly 14 per cent to 546,000, after that they 
continued to rise at around 10 per cent per annum until the early 1960s and then at a 
slightly lower rate after that. 
Given the political context at the time, and also that the crime statistics had never 
before fallen by such an order of magnitude, direct control of the statistics provides 
a far more likely explanation than simple coincidence, for why the number of crimes 
should have risen and fallen by almost exactly the number of serving officers. This 
evidence also suggests that it may have been possible, in some way, for a national 
total figure for crime to have been set in advance and for this then to have been divi-
ded between the nine conference areas for parcelling out to individual forces. If fur-
ther research were to confirm that there was central control, it would go a long way 
towards explaining how the criminal statistics maintained such an astonishingly uni-
form rate of increase for nearly eighty years (figure 1) despite the many social, 
demographic, and economic changes that transformed society during that period. 
IX . 
In the 1960s, J.J. Tobias, a British historian of crime, expressed his grave doubts 
about the utility of the British judicial statistics which, he said, « have little to tell us 
about crime and criminals » 1 2 6. The only factor he found that consistently affected 
the statistics was a change in the chief constable for a particular district127. This 
paper largely endorses Tobias' findings but extends his conclusions. The reason, it 
suggests, that a change of chief constable affected the statistics was that both the 
quantitative and qualitative recording of crime was largely pre-determined by sup-
ply-side factors such as politics, budgets, and pay, and not by demand, that is to say 
the amount and type of crime originally reported to the police. Of course, the 
quantity and quality of crimes that were reported by the public to the police were 
beyond their control, however, how they were recorded and processed was a matter 
of policy and that policy was set by the chief constable. Therefore, the immense 
value of the statistics to the historian is not that they allow conclusions to be drawn 
about the quality or quantity of crime in the real world, but rather that an historically 
contextualized reading of the statistics greatly assists in the reconstruction of 
the supply-side quotas, policies, priorities and politics that underlay criminal 
justice. 
From this it follows that, in most cases, it is methodologically invalid to use the 
judicial statistics as an indicator of the effectiveness of other social programmes. 
Nonetheless, as the police establishment continued to widen the base of its statistics 
after the First World War, it convinced politicians and the public that crime was 
really increasing by leaps and bounds and this, in turn, helped misrepresent the out-
come of welfare and educational policies as at best ineffective sentimentality and at 
worst a foolish and profligate transfer of resources to the lowest moral strata of 
society. Terence Morris, a British criminologist, has described how « increasingly 
after 1945... popular sentiment was often prone to suggesting that the increased pro-
1 2 6
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vision of welfare resulted in sapping of the moral fibre of the nation... it was but a 
short step to including increased criminality, and especially juvenile criminality, as 
one of the perhaps unintended but nevertheless inevitable consequences » 1 2 8. The 
long-term result of this was that by the 1990s crime had replaced poverty and the 
welfare of the nation as a major political problem in Britain. 
The Desborough award had transformed the politics of crime for the rest of the 
twentieth century. By triggering rising crime statistics, it moved crime control back 
onto the political agenda as a major competitor for precious resources against social 
services. Yet, the decision, whether or not crime control merited increased 
resources, was not made on the basis of statistics that allowed any meaningful 
assessment to be made of the extent of crime or of the effectiveness of increased 
police resources in controlling it. In the early 1930s the ominous direction criminal 
justice was taking had already been noted by Dan Griffiths, a member of the Depart-
mental Committee on the Persistent Offender. He warned that crime 
has been raised to the status of an institution and has become a profession and a 
kind of vested interest to a host of respectable people who make a living out of 
criminal law administration... It is not natural to expect people who live on crime, 
rather than by crime, to be willing to jeopardise the source of their own liveli-
hood129. 
Howard Taylor 
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University Park 
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